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INTRODUCTION

The Constitution prohibits the government from depriving
anyone of a property interest without first according that person
procedural due process. 1 The Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause codified the natural law principle that government cannot
arbitrarily deprive its citizens of the property they have acquired
through their participation in civil society. 2 However, during the
due process revolution of the 1960s, the Court extended the
constitutional definition of property to include government
employment.
If a public employee had an expectation of
continued employment, the government could not terminate that
job, or property, without first giving that person sufficient due
process protections. Under this new approach to property, a
public employee did not just acquire a job from her government
employer, he or she also acquired a constitutionally protected
property interest. Thus, in their employment relationship, public
employees, by way of the Due Process Clause, possessed
something that none of their private sector colleagues possessed:
a constitutional right to their job.

t Associate Professor of Law, University of South Dakota School of Law; J.D.
and Ph.D., University of Minnesota.
1 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV § 1.
2 See J.A.C. Grant, The Natural Law Background of Due Process, 31 COLUM. L.
REV. 56, 56 (1931) (discussing how due process rights do not flow from the
Constitution, but are natural rights).
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This extension of property protections brought a significant
change in the focus of the Due Process Clauses. During the
eighteenth, nineteenth, and first half of the twentieth centuries,
due process protections pertained to the relationship between
citizens and their government. Procedural due process aimed to
check and prevent a sovereign authority's arbitrary deprivations
of certain fundamental rights of its citizens. As such, due process
rights were shared equally by all citizens. The necessity of such
rights resulted from the fact that, regarding actions by the
sovereign, citizens had no other remedies available to them to
redress actions by the sovereign: There was no other sovereign to
which the citizens could appeal, no other sovereign that could
rectify the injustices. However, after the due process revolution
had infused the public employment area with due process rights,
public employees obtained a special constitutional protection that
no other citizens had enjoyed. Moreover, due process rights were
given even though public employees had an adequate and ample
alternative for the loss of their jobs: They could go out into the
private sector, where the majority of jobs existed, and obtain
employment.
By equating government employment with constitutionally
protected property, the courts have muddied the traditional focus
of the Due Process Clauses and blurred the distinctions between
government functions and roles. Government as employer was
equated with government as sovereign. This Article attempts to
reveal the error of that equation. It seeks to revive the original
focus of the Due Process Clauses and highlight the constitutional
relevance of the distinction between government as sovereign
and government as employer. In doing so, the Article relies on
the doctrines governing the First Amendment speech rights of
public employees as an analogy for how the due process rights of
public employees should be defined.
In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Supreme Court recently clarified
the First Amendment speech rights of government employees. 3
According to the Court, public employees who speak as a result of
the required duties of their job, who speak as employees rather
than as citizens, do not have a First Amendment protection from
subsequent disciplinary action by their employers. This ruling
obviously hinges the granting of constitutional rights on the vital
3 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2006).
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distinction of how the individual is acting or speaking: Is she
exercising her constitutional rights as a citizen, or is she simply
performing the job functions required by her government
employer? Such a distinction, as argued in this Article, should be
reincorporated into the due process doctrines governing public
employees. If a right as fundamental and basic as the First
Amendment right to free speech hinges on whether the
individual-government relationship is one of employee-employer
or citizen-sovereign, then the procedural due process rights of
public employees should be similarly qualified.
I.

THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

Under current due process doctrines, government employees
can have a property right in their continued employment, where
interference with that employment must be preceded by due
process protections. 4 The Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal
government from depriving a person's life, liberty, and property
without providing adequate due process.5 Up until the midtwentieth century, courts defined property interests by looking at
how the common law had defined property; however, in Goldberg
v. Kelly, the Supreme Court took a drastic turn from precedent
and significantly expanded the legal sources of property interests
eligible for due process protections. 6 In Goldberg, the Court ruled
that statutory entitlements like welfare benefits could also
constitute a property interest, not just a governmentally
conferred privilege, thus, entitling recipients to full adversarialtype hearings before those benefits could be terminated.7 Later,
in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, the Court extended
this new due process property approach to include a public
employee's interest in continued government employment. 8 As
4

See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 539, 542 (1985)

(applying constitutional protections to tenured government employees).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that no person shall be "deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use without just compensation"); see also id. amend. XIV (stating that no
state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law").
6 397 U.S. 254, 261-63 (1970) (holding that an interest in continued welfare
benefits was a statutory entitlement that equated to a property interest under the
Due Process Clause).
7 Id.
8 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972) (holding that a state college professor could have
a property interest in his job if he had a government-created expectation in
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the Court stated, a property interest is "defined by existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent source such as
state law."9 If state law, for instance, entitled the employee to
continued employment subject to certain terms, then a
constitutionally protected property interest could arise. 10
The current constitutional status of public employment
contrasts with the way courts formerly treated public
employment. Up until the 1950s, courts viewed the rights of
government employees through the lens of rights and privileges:
Public employment was seen as a privilege, rather than a right,
that could be withdrawn at any time without any due process."
This right-privilege distinction was based on the view that no
2
person had a constitutional right to government largess.'
According to this view, as perhaps most famously articulated by
Oliver Wendell Holmes, public employment is a privilege that the
government is free to grant or withhold at its pleasure.' 3 This
continued employment).
9 Id. at 577. Such a state law creating a property interest was present in
Loudermill, where the employee was covered by a state statute entitling civil
servants to retain their jobs "during good behavior and efficient service" and could
not be fired "except [for] ... misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office." 470 U.S. at 53839 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 124.34(A) (West 1984)). The Court has held that
due process must be given to a nonprobationary public employee when, after his
probationary period, the employee acquires a property interest in continued
employment. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972). In addition, even
when there is an informal probationary period, an "expectation" of continued
employment can create a constitutionally protected property interest. Id.
10 See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538.
11 Robert Charles Ludolph, Termination of Faculty Tenure Rights Due to
Financial Exigency and Program Discount Center, 63 U. DET. L. REV. 609, 614
(1986). The early courts reasoned that, unless specifically provided for by statute,
public employees occupied strictly employment-at-will positions. See, e.g., Reagan v.
United States, 182 U.S. 419, 424 (1901) (noting that "inferior" offices not held for life
or a fixed tenure fall under the settled rule that the "power of removal is incident to
the power of appointment"); Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 330-34 (1897)
(noting that members of Congress considered the president's power of removal to be
a settled question); In re Hennen, 38 U.S. 230, 233-34 (1839) (discussing the power
of removal from office as a political question and noting that the power of
appointment implies the power of removal).
12 See William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439, 1440-42 (1968). Under the rightprivilege distinction, courts lump government jobs into the larger category of
government largess, and thus as privileges that can be withdrawn at any time. See
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142-44 (1983) (outlining the history of the rights
privilege doctrine).
13 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) ("The
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no

2007]

THE EMPLOYER-SOVEREIGN RELATIONSHIP

801

view reflected a private sector vision of the public employment
relationship: One does not possess a basket of rights that private
sector employees do not possess merely because one works for the
government. 14

Beginning in the early 1960s, however, the individual
rights movement transformed the traditional view of public
employees. 15 Throughout this individual rights era, the Court
moved beyond the right-privilege distinction and steadily
expanded the rights of public employees. 16 During the 1970s'
"due process explosion," the Court completely cast aside the
right-privilege distinction and held that public employment could
indeed qualify as a property interest.' 7 In Perry v. Sindermann,
for instance, the Court found that a faculty manual, along with
guidelines promulgated by the state college system, created a
property interest for a faculty member because the institution's
actions legitimated his claim of entitlement to continued
employment.1 8
This holding effectively guaranteed lifetime
tenure for the faculty member.' 9
constitutional right to be a policeman."); see also Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341
U.S. 716, 720 (1951) (stating that a government employer can require an individual
to provide any and all information relevant to prove the employee's fitness and
suitability for public service).
14 See Developments in the Law--Public Employment: The Constitutional Rights
of Public Employees, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1738, 1743 (1984) [hereinafter Constitutional
Rights of Public Employees]; see also Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952)
(analogizing public employment to at will employment in the non-public sector).
15 ConstitutionalRights of Public Employees, supra note 14, at 1744.
16 During this period, the Court expanded the constitutional rights of public
employees on a number of fronts, including their First Amendment right of free
speech. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (reversing the circuit
court decision to allow the discharge of a public school teacher for speaking out on a
matter of public concern).
17 See Bd. of Regents of State Sch. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Both cases involved untenured college professors
who were fired at the end of their employment contracts without a hearing. Roth,
408 U.S. at 566; Perry, 408 U.S. at 594-96. While the Court held that no property
interest existed in Roth, 408 U.S. at 579, the Perry Court held that a constitutionally
protected property right may exist if the employee can prove the legitimacy of his
claim of entitlement to continued employment based on rules and understanding
promulgated by the public employer. Perry, 408 U.S. at 602-03. To make this
determination, the Court paid close attention to the particular tenure laws at issue
to see if they created a property interest in continued employment. Roth, 408 U.S. at
566-67, 578; Perry, 408 U.S. at 599-01. Regarding the due process explosion, see
Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing,123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1975).
18 408 U.S. at 600-03.
19 Thus, even though not formally tenured by the college, the faculty member
had the opportunity to prove in the district court that he had a legitimate
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The Loudermill Court-by holding that a property interest,
once created by state or local law, must be given full
constitutional due process protections and could not be subject to
any procedural limitations set out in the statute that created
it 20-rejected the rule of Arnett v. Kennedy, which held that a
21
property interest could be conditioned or limited in that way.
In Arnett, the Court held that a property interest could be
conditioned by statutorily created "procedural limitations which
had accompanied the grant of that interest."22 The Loudermill
Court, however, rejected the notion that a state could create a
limited property interest in employment (limited by statutory
procedures governing the termination of that interest); instead,
the Court held that once a property interest is created by state
law, its deprivation is to be governed by constitutional due
process procedures, regardless of any statutorily imposed
procedures. 23 Thus, according to Loudermill, even though a
particular statute creating a property interest might designate
the terms of employment and the means or methods by which
that employment can be modified or terminated, the procedures
for depriving that property interest are governed by the Due
24
Process Clause rather than by the statute itself.
Subsequent public-employment due process decisions have
invoked due process requirements and found property
expectation to continued employment, which in turn would give him a de facto

tenure. Id. at 602-03.
20

See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).

416 U.S. 134, 153 (1974) ("[W]here the grant of a substantive right is
inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be
employed in determining that right, a litigant... must take the bitter with the
sweet.").
22 Id. at 155.
23 See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541. According to the Court, "The right to due
process 'is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee.'" Id.
at 541 (quoting Arnett, 416 U.S. at 167). In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist restated
his Arnett position that states should be able to grant conditional property interests.
Id. at 561 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He argued that if state law created property
interests, then that law should also be able to impose procedural limitations. Id. at
562-63. He also argued for adoption of the rule that "one who avails himself of
government entitlements accepts the grant of tenure along with its inherent
limitations." Id. at 563.
24 See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541. The Court held that though a property
interest in continued employment can be created by statute, that statute cannot
dictate the means by which the government cannot deprive an individual of that
interest. See id. Instead, the procedures for terminating that property interest are to
be governed by the Due Process Clause. See id.
21
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deprivations even when an employee has not been terminated. 2 5
According to case law, a reasonable expectation in a particular
position can constitute a property interest. 26 In Ciambriello v.
County of Nassau, the court ruled that a denial of a promotion to
which the employee had a reasonable expectation amounted to a
deprivation of a property interest. 27 A court has even held that
certain job titles or designations rise to the level of legitimate
property interests. 28 However, on the question of whether a
government contract is enough to create a property interest,

the courts are somewhat divided. 29 According to some courts,
contractual provisions alone are sufficient, and violations of those
provisions amount to the deprivation of property interests. 30 But
in other jurisdictions, contractual provisions are not sufficient to
1
bestow property interests on government employees. 3
The due process explosion of the 1960s and 1970s greatly
expanded and broadened the understanding of due process. This
expansion of procedural due process protections reflected a notion
25 See, e.g., Sonnleitner v. York, 304 F.3d 704, 713 (7th Cir. 2002) (applying due
process to an employee's demotion); Greenwood v. New York, 163 F.3d 119, 122 (2d
Cir. 1998) (holding that psychiatrists have a property interest in their clinical
privileges); Winegar v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 20 F.3d 895, 900-01 (8th
Cir. 1994) (holding that due process procedures were invoked by a transfer of an
employee).
26 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Qualified Immunity: § 1983 Litigation in the Public
Employment Context, 21 TOURO L. REV. 551, 555 (2005).
27 292 F.3d 307, 318 (2d Cir. 2002).
28 Ezekwo v. NYC Health & Hosps. Corp., 940 F.2d 775, 783 (2d Cir. 1991)
(denying that an interest in the designation of chief resident was "trivial" and
finding that hospital policy had entitled the person to the position of chief resident at
the hospital).
29 Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 556-57.
30 See Brockell v. Norton, 688 F.2d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding that
"common practices and agreements derived from the employer-employee
relationship which would create a sufficient expectancy of continued employment"
establish a property interest); see also Yates v. Bd. of Regents, 654 F. Supp. 979, 981
(E.D. Tex. 1987) (stating that a property interest could be created either in an
employment agreement "or in a state statute, rule, or regulation").
31 See, e.g., Downtown Auto Parks v. City of Milwaukee, 938 F.2d 705, 711 (7th
Cir. 1991); Gaumond v. City of Melissa, 227 F. Supp. 2d 627, 631 (E.D. Tex. 2002)
(holding that the "existence of a property interest must be determined by reference
to state law"). Thus, according to Professor Chemerinsky, "the jurisdictions are split
on the issue of whether a contract creates a property interest for government
employees." Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 557 (citing Hulen v. Yates, 322 F.3d
1229, 1240 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that contracts created by state agencies present
property interests)); see also Wells v. Hico Indep. Sch. Dist., 736 F.2d 243, 255 (5th
Cir. 1984) (holding that no property interest was created by a state-initiated one
year teaching contract).
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that the law should protect a system of rights that would
32
maintain "independence, dignity and pluralism in society."
Thus, the traditional protections given to common law forms of
property were now to be extended to the new forms of property,
such as government benefits and jobs. 33 For the advocates of this
due process explosion, the purpose of government benefits was to
preserve the individual's rightful share in society. 34 Yet even
early advocates of broadened due process protections did not
consider public employment to be one of the benefits that
qualified as property: As one scholar put it, a government job
does not reflect "an arrangement which exists for the sake of its
35
holder, in order to satisfy one of his basic needs."
In eighteenth century America, due process rights were
equated with rights arising out of natural law. 36 Procedural due
process was tied to common law rights and natural rights.3 7 The
notion of due process held during the constitutional period
reflected the idea that natural law acted as a limitation on
governmental power. 38 Thus, under this approach, a natural law
concept of property should apply to the kind of property given
due process protections-property held and acquired by citizens
that, under common law or natural rights rationales, should be
immune from governmental interference. 39 This constitutionally
32 Charles A. Reich, The New Property,73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964).
33 See id. at 756-64.
34 See id. at 785-86.
35 Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due
Process, in DUE PROCESS 126, 145 (J. Roland Pennock et al eds., 1977).
36 See LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 2 (1958). The natural rights
discussions of the nineteenth century were frequently associated with a natural
right concept of property. See R.H. Helmholz, The Law of Nature and the Early
History of Unenumerated Rights in the United States, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 401--02,
410 (2007).
37 See J. Roland Pennock, Introduction, in DUE PROCESS, supra note 35, at xv,
xvi-xvii.
38 See John Adams, Minutes of the Argument: Lechmere's Case, in 1 BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 184, 184-85 (1971).
39 As envisioned by late eighteenth century Americans, the due process clause
had roots in the Magna Carta as a source of rights on which the government could
not infringe. See 4 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 445 (Albert H. Smyth ed.,
1970). These rights involved the most basic and fundamental rights, such as the
right to be free of imprisonment without the due process of law or the arbitrary
taking of private property without adequate due process. See 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134-35, *138-40. According to the Blackstonian
understandings existing during the eighteenth century, the property protected by
due process requirements referred to possessions, both real and personal. See Frank
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protected property was the kind of property that laid the
groundwork for a well-ordered society, the kind of property that
created "the material foundation for creating and maintaining
40
the proper social order, the private basis for the public good."
The rights to which due process protections also apply relate
to the type of fundamental rights that government must
respect. 41 These fundamental rights were defined during the
constitutional period primarily as "common law property rights,
and rights to traditional institutional arrangements and legal
procedures." 42 The fact that the rights meant to be protected
by the Due Process Clause were only the most basic and
fundamental rights is also indicated by the placement of the
Fifth Amendment, which follows the First Amendment protection
of speech, press, assembly, and religious exercise, 43 the Second
Amendment right to bear arms, 44 the Third Amendment
limitations on the quartering of soldiers, 45 and the
46
Fourth Amendment protections against search and seizure.
Furthermore, the Fifth Amendment precedes the Sixth
Amendment right to a free and speedy criminal trial, 47 the
Seventh Amendment guaranty of trial by jury, 48 and the Eighth
Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. 49 As
with all these enumerated rights protections, the Due Process
Clause serves as an additional limitation on the powers of the
central government regarding the most fundamental rights of its
citizens.

H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 85, 95-98 (1983);
Henry Paul Monaghan, Of "Liberty"and"Property,"62CORNELL L. REV. 405, 411-12
(1977).
40 GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970, at 1 (1997).

41 The reference to life, liberty and property reflects a natural rights approach to
due process protections. See generally Charles A. Miller, The Forest of Due Processof
Law: The American Constitutional Tradition, in DUE PROCESS, supra note 35, at 3,

10.

42 Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in
American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 892 (1978).
43 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.

44 See id. amend. II.
45 See id. amend. III.
46

See id. amend. IV.

47 See id. amend. VI.
48 See id. amend. VII.
49 See id. amend. VIII.
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The notion of due process relates broadly to the ways in
which all citizens confront and are affected by their government,
not to the more selective, customized ways in which individuals
intersect with the government, such as in an employment
context. This is because, for instance, the government has a
"greater and more obvious interest in controlling the behavior of
its employees than its interest in controlling the conduct of
citizens in general." 50 As will be argued in the section below,
constitutional rights should generally apply only to the
relationship between government and citizens.
According to Professor Amar, "There is a ... conspicuous
connection between the Fourth Amendment's limitations on
'seizures' of 'houses' and 'effects' and the Fifth's restrictions on
'takings' of 'private property.' "51 Accordingly, this definition of
''property" means private property that is acquired in a person's
private capacity, independent of government.
It suggests a
natural rights theory of property, that the Due Process Clause
protects the kind of property that has ancient roots, the kind that
has been historically abused by government and is unique to the
individual. Government jobs, on the other hand, are not unique
to the individual holder. They are pre-designed employment
positions to which individuals must conform. If one individual
withdraws from a particular job, another individual is hired to
fill that same pre-designed job.
II. THE ANALOGY TO PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH RIGHTS
The issue of whether the job status or expectations of public
employees rises to the level of constitutionally protected property
interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause has
many parallels with the issue of whether public employees have
First Amendment rights regarding speech made in connection
with their duties and functions as public employees. Both of
these issues raise questions relating to whether government
50 Mary M. Cheh, Judicial Supervision of Executive Secrecy: Rethinking
Freedom of Expression for Government Employees and the Public Right of Access to
Government Information, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 690, 704 (1984). For an example of the
government's special interest in controlling its employees, see generally Snepp v.
United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509, 510 n.3 (1980), holding that the CIA could require
its employees to sign prepublication review agreements as a condition of
employment.
51 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 80
(1998).
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employment has an effect on an individual's constitutional rights.
Are speech and property rights defined in connection with the
status of citizenship alone, or are they also determined by one's
employment? Do public employees have essentially more rights
than citizens employed in the private sector, such as rights of job
tenure and freedom of speech? Is there a distinction between
citizen and employee that has constitutional relevance?
The evolution of public employee speech cases mirror, in
some respects, the evolution in the due process public
employment cases. Both types of cases grapple with determining
the impact on an individual's constitutional rights caused by his
or her employment by the government. 52 However, unlike the
due process area, public employee speech doctrines have
undergone a correction since their expansion during the Warren
Court era. In particular, the Supreme Court's latest decision in
the public employee speech context suggests that the Court
should, in turn, rethink its position on the issue of whether a
government job qualifies as property under the Due Process
53
Clause.
A.

The Evolution of Public Employee Speech Rights

Up until the 1960s, the judicial doctrines covering public
employee speech were fairly deferential to employers. 54 Public
employee speech was given practically no constitutional
protection from employer disciplinary action. 5 5 As with their
private sector counterparts, government employees had virtually
56
no free speech rights they could assert against their employers.
The reasoning behind this rule was famously articulated by
Oliver Wendell Holmes in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford,
where the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld an
52 Compare Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-40 (1985)
(discussing whether public employment can create a constitutionally protected
property interest under the Due Process Clause), with Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.
Ct. 1951, 1958 (2006) (discussing the extent to which public employment imposes
limitations on free speech rights).
53 See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1958.
54 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-44 (1983); McAuliffe v. Mayor of
New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (Mass. 1892).
55 See Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1007, 1028-29 (2005); Lawrence Rosenthal, Permissible Content Discrimination
Under the FirstAmendment: The Strange Case of the Public Employee, 25 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 529, 530 (1998).
56 See Kozel, supra note 55, at 1028.
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ordinance prohibiting police officers from engaging in political
fundraising.5 7 According to Holmes, a policeman "may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
right to be a policeman."5 8 Consequently, a policeman, just like
any other public employee, must take that employment "on the
59
terms which are offered him."
This judicial deference to the actions of government in its
role as employer prevailed into the 1950s. 60 A year after Garner,
the Supreme Court, in Adler v. Board of Education, upheld a
similar law in New York that made any person who advocated
overthrowing the government by violent or unlawful means
ineligible for employment in public office, particularly in the
public school system. 6 1 In drawing the distinction between
government as employer and government as sovereign, the Court
stated that while public employees "have the right under our law
to assemble, speak, think, and believe as they will," they do not
have the right "to work for the State in the school system on their
own
terms."62
But in the
1960s, the Holmesian
model gave way to the Warren Court's heightened attention to
individual rights.
In a marked departure from past precedent, the Court began
giving greater protections to the speech rights of public
employees. 63 Ushering in this new era of public employee speech
protection was the Court's decision in Pickering v. Board of
Education, which involved the termination of a public school
teacher who had published a letter to the editor criticizing the

57 29 N.E. at 517.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 518. As part of the bargain entered into by a public employer with a
public employee, the latter agrees to a restriction on his or her speech rights. Id. at
517-18.
60 See, e.g., Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 717-20 (1951) (upholding

a city law requiring government employees to take an oath that they were not
affiliated with a Communist organization within the past five years). According to
the Court, past conduct and loyalty "are commonly inquired into in determining
fitness for both high and low positions in private industry and are not less relevant
in public employment." Id. at 720. Thus, it was constitutionally irrelevant that the
employer in this case was the government. As Justice Frankfurter stated in his
concurrence, "[The] Constitution does not guarantee public employment." Id. at 724
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61 342 U.S. 485, 487-89, 493, 496 (1952).
62 Id. at 492.
63 See Van Alstyne, supra note 12, at 1442.
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64
Board of Education's handling of a proposed tax increase.
Ruling that public employees do not relinquish their First
Amendment rights when they assume their government jobs, the
Court created a new balancing test to determine whether public
employee speech is constitutionally protected: "The problem in
any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
65
through its employees."
Applying this test in Pickering, the Court found that since
the letter obviously related to a matter of public concern and did
not interfere with the operation or efficiency of the school, the
Board of Education had no more right to curtail the teacher's
speech than it would have to curtail the speech of any other
citizen. 66 Notwithstanding this holding, the Court recognized
that the interests of the government "as an employer in

regulating the speech of its employees ...

differ significantly

from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the
67
speech of the citizenry in general."
By blurring the line between government as sovereign and
government as employer, the Pickering balancing test took a
big step away from the Holmesian model of deference to
governmental authority. 68 Another step was taken fifteen years
later when the Court further explained the "public concern"
factor articulated in Pickering, adopting it as a threshold test to
the Pickering balancing test. In Connick v. Myers, a disgruntled
district attorney was fired for insubordination after distributing
to her colleagues a questionnaire dealing with a variety of
workplace matters, including office morale and employee
confidence in supervisors. 69 To determine whether a First
64 391 U.S. 563-64, 568 (1968) (stating that the Holmesian approach was
"unequivocally rejected").
65 Id. at 568, 574. In reversing the Illinois Supreme Court, which upheld the
Board's action, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the lower court had not accorded
high enough protections to the teacher's free speech rights as a citizen, which had to
be weighed against the government's interests as an employer. Id.
66 Id. at 572-73.
67 Id. at 568.
68 See O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 716-17 (1996)
(acknowledging the abandonment of the Holmesian model).
69 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983) (involving a claim that the termination violated the
employee's free speech rights).
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Amendment violation occurred, the Court undertook first to
determine whether the speech in question, distributed through
the questionnaire, involved a matter of public concern. 70 This
was a threshold issue to be decided even before application of the
71
Pickeringbalancing test.
In Connick, the Court distinguished between matters of
public concern and "matters only of personal interest," such as
employee grievances. 72 As the Court stated, except for "the most
unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate
forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision"
involving employee grievances that have no public concern and
which an employer should be free to handle as it sees fit. 73 The
distinction between
employees-speaking-as-employees
and
employees-speaking-as-citizens was crucial, since speech that did
not touch upon matters of public concern was not eligible for the
Pickering balancing test. 74 As a citizen, a person can speak freely
on just about any topic without restriction from her sovereignthe government-but as a public employee, a person can have her
non-public concern workplace speech controlled by her

70 Id. at 146. The Court held that the distribution of the questionnaire was in
connection with a private dispute between employee and employer and hence did not
involve a matter of public concern. Id. at 148. Since the speech did not involve a
matter of public concern, there was no need to proceed with any further analysis or
balancing. Id. at 146. In emphasizing that citizens still possess their full
fundamental rights even while employed by the government, the Court adopted the
test that the constitutional protection of public employee speech depends on whether
the employee spoke "as a citizen upon matters of public concern" or "as an employee
upon matters only of personal interest." Id. at 147. Thus, the public concern test is a
way for courts to determine if the rights of citizens or the rights of employees are at
stake.
71 See id. at 146.
72 See id. at 147. Although the Court was aware of how government employer
sanctions could chill the speech rights of its employees, the Court stated that the
government "should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive
oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment." Id. at 146. As the
Court recognized, "[T]he First Amendment's primary aim is the full protection of
speech upon issues of public concern, as well as the practical realities involved in the
administration of a government office." Id. at 154.
73 See id. at 147. "When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as
relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,
government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without
intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment." Id. at 146.
The public concern determination was preliminary to a Pickering balance test. See
id.
74 See Kozel, supra note 55, at 1024-25.
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government employer, just as a private-sector employee can have
75
her speech controlled by her private employer.
B.

The Court's Most Recent Pronouncement

Although Connick took a somewhat narrow view regarding
what kind of speech constituted a matter of public concern,
essentially ruling that workplace grievances were not a topic of
public concern, subsequent courts have tended to define "public
concern" more broadly. 76 But, not until its recent decision in
Garcetti v. Ceballos did the Supreme Court address the
constitutional status of a public employee's speech made in
furtherance of employment duties. 77 Previous cases, as reflected
by Pickering and Connick, focused on peripheral statements
made by employees during work rather than on speech required
78
to be made as part of the employee's official duties.
75 Id. at 1029. According to Professor Kozel, the "decoupling of governmental
functions is important to understanding the model: The government as sovereign
regulator of private conduct is limited by the First Amendment in its ability to
restrict citizen speech, but when the government steps out of its role as sovereign
and into its role as employer, it transcends these limitations." Id.
76 See, e.g., Tucker v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 1996)
("[C]ourts have defined public concern speech broadly to include almost any matter
other than speech that relates to internal power struggles within the workplace.");
Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1273 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (stating that the term public concern relates "not to the number of interested
listeners or readers but to whether the expression relates to some issue of interest
beyond the employee's bureaucratic niche"), affd in part, rev'd in part, 513 U.S. 454
(1995).
77 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
78 Such cases, however, had been decided in the circuits. For instance, in
Urofsky v. Gilmore, the Fourth Circuit ruled that to determine the constitutional
status of public employee speech, a court must first decide whether the employee
spoke as a private citizen or as a public employee. 216 F.3d 401, 406 (4th Cir. 2000)
(ruling that when a public employee acts in accordance with her workplace duties
and hence as an agent of the government, that employee's speech is not
constitutionally protected). To explain this determination, the Urofsky court referred
to the hypothetical of a district attorney making a public statement about a murder
trial: Because the statement is a required part of the attorney's work duties, he or
she has no right to disobey a supervisor's directions about the content of the
statement, even though the statement is obviously of public concern. See id. at 40708. However, as the court explained, the attorney could freely publish a newspaper
editorial accusing the district attorney's office of breaching its prosecutorial duties,
since in that case the attorney would be speaking as a citizen. Id. at 408. Thus, in
Urofsky, the constitutional protection of public employee speech depended first on
the role of the speaker (e.g., whether the speaker spoke as a citizen or employee) and
then on whether the speech involved a matter of public concern. Id. at 406.
According to the court, without such an approach, a constitutional issue might arise
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In Garcetti, a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles
County District Attorney's Office was demoted after filing a
disposition memorandum outlining alleged false statements
contained in an affidavit used to obtain a critical search warrant
and informing defense counsel of those false statements. 79 The
demoted deputy district attorney then commenced a suit alleging
that his demotion had been in retaliation for speech protected by
the First Amendment.8 0 In denying this claim, the Court held
that the First Amendment did not apply because the deputy
district attorney spoke as an employee and not as a citizen when
8
he wrote his critical memorandum. '
Under this rule, when public employees speak as part of
their employment duties, they do not speak as citizens and hence
are not accorded constitutional protection from their employers'
disciplinary actions.8 2 Recognizing that the "government as
employer indeed has far broader powers than does the
government as sovereign,"8 3 the Court stated that the First
Amendment "does not empower
[public employees] to
'constitutionalize the employee grievance[s].' "84
To accord
constitutional protection to the speech in the case at hand,
according to the Garcetti Court, would be to undermine employer
authority and force the judiciary into "a new, permanent, and
85
intrusive role."
The issue in Garcetti was not whether the particular speech
involved a matter of public concern (which it clearly did), but
whether the speech was made by a government employee in
furtherance of his official duties.8 6 For this reason, the Court
every time a government employee performs a work-related function. Id. at 408.
79 See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1972 & n.14.
80 Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct.
1951 (2006).
8 See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960 ("Restricting speech that owes its existence to
a public employee's professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the
employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.").
82 See id. According to the Court, public employees occupy "trusted positions in
society" and must exercise caution when speaking, as their views may be read as a
contravention to governmental policies or could operate as an impairment of
governmental functions. Id. at 1958.
83 Id. (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994)).
84 Id. at 1959 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983)).
85 Id.
at 1961. The Court also argued that government employees are
adequately protected by 'legislative enactments-such as whistle-blower protection
laws and labor codes." Id. at 1962.
86 See id. at 1955.
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took a different approach than had been taken in Connick. Since
the deputy district attorney in Garcetti investigated the affidavit
and wrote his memorandum as part of his assigned employment
duties, he acted as a government employee rather than as a
citizen; consequently, his supervisors had every right to criticize
his performance and take disciplinary action.8 7 Thus, if a public
employee speaks not as a citizen but as an employee of the
government, the Connick public concern test and the Pickering
88
balancing test are not even reached.
The Garcetti Court more or less adopted a per se rule that
built upon the phrase "as a citizen" in the public concern test as
articulated in Connick.8 9
The rule makes a fundamental
distinction based on the relation of the individual speaker to the
government. If the relationship is one of citizen to sovereign, the
First Amendment governs. But, if the relationship is one of
employee to employer, no constitutional protection comes into
play. Public employees speaking "pursuant to [their] official
duties" do not speak "as citizens for First Amendment purposes,"
regardless of whether their speech might touch upon matters of
public concern. 90
III. APPLYING PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH DOCTRINES TO THE
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

The crucial distinction made in Garcetti was one of whether
the individual was acting as a citizen or as a government
employee. 9 1 First Amendment rights attach only to those public
employees who are acting as citizens. Thus, it is the role of the
person asserting the right that is determinative. When a person
is speaking not as a citizen but as a government employee, that
person is not entitled to the protections of the First Amendment,
which serves to protect citizens from an overreaching sovereign.
The First Amendment does not encompass a special protection
for government employees, which incidentally constituted a
minute fraction of the U.S. population in the late eighteenth
87 Id. at 1959-60 ("Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public
employee's professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee
might have enjoyed as a private citizen.").
88 See id. at 1960.
89 See id.; Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
90 Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960.
91 See id. at 1959-61.
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century. 92 Likewise, the Due Process Clause should protect the
property that individuals acquire as citizens, but not the job
expectations they acquire as government employees. For this
reason, the decision in Garcetti should have a spillover effect on
the due process public employment cases, since the same
employee-citizen distinction exists in those cases as in the public
employee speech cases.
Constitutional rights should only reside in the most basic
level in society, the common denominator level which all
individuals share. Constitutional rights should relate to the
citizen-sovereign relationship because that is the relationship
that every individual possesses and shares with one another.
Constitutional rights cannot reside in a relationship possessed by
only a few members of society like the government employergovernment employee relationship.
As the public employee speech cases reveal, the distinction
between employee and citizen carries vitalconstitutional
relevance.
Indeed, as Garcetti suggests, the test for
constitutional protection of public employee speech is a "but for"
test:
But for the employment relationship, would the
government be able to restrict the speech at issue? In Garcetti,
the deputy district attorney learned of the facts about which he
spoke not because he was a citizen, but because he was a
government employee.
Thus, his speech was possible only
because he was a government employee charged with performing
certain duties.
Garcetti also marks a certain retrenchment from the
Pickering-Connick line of cases; it places primary importance on
the citizen-employee distinction for purposes of designating
constitutional rights. 93
Garcetti treats the citizen-employee
94
distinction as more controlling than the kind of speech uttered.
Similarly, the type of government job or the expectations
surrounding it should not be as important in determining
constitutional due process rights as the citizen-employee
distinction.

92

See Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417, 470 (1998) (citing BUREAU OF THE

CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES:

COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, pt. 1, at 8 (1975).
93 See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1959-61.
94

See id.
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Government employment is a creation of the legislative
process, and hence should be governed by that process. As
suggested in Garcetti, if there is value in having government
employees speak out openly and without restraint about the
workings of their government offices, then laws can be passed to
grant that freedom and protection to public employees. 95 The
efficient, responsive, and non-corrupt working of the government
is a citizen concern, a democratic process concern.
If the
democratic community wishes to receive critical or exposing
speech from government employees, despite its effect on the
efficient operation of government offices, then the legislature can
pass laws to ensure and protect such speech. 96 This interest
corresponds to what Vincent Blasi once called "the checking
value" of free speech, or the ability of speech, particularly by
government insiders, to expose instances of government waste

and corruption. 9 7 But, this value can just as easily be protected
by whistleblower statutes. 98 If the democratic community needs
or desires free and open "whistleblower" speech, it can enact the
appropriate laws as it has done so on numerous occasions. 99
This same logic applies to the protection of public employee
job rights and expectations. If a democratic community wishes to
95 See id. at 1962.
96 Bolstering the claim that due process rights should not pertain to government
employment, Justice O'Connor has stated that the government employer possesses
wide discretion in firing or sanctioning its employees, given the interest in running
an efficient, responsive, and non-corrupt public service. See Bd. of County Comm'ns
v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996); see also Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 672
(1994) (distinguishing the government's roles as sovereign and employer by arguing
that when the government acts as an employer, certain constitutional rights should
not be applicable to government employees' speech).
97 See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 527, 634 (1977) (arguing that the ability of free speech to
check governmental officials' abuse of power is particularly served by protecting
"speech critical of public officials by those persons in the best position to know what
they are talking about-namely, government employees").
98 The Court in Garcetti expressed this notion when it stated that public
employees were well protected by "legislative enactments-such as whistle-blower
protection laws and labor codes." 126 S. Ct. at 1962. Thus, even though the Court
acknowledged "the public's interest in receiving informed opinion" regarding the
inside operation of government, such interest could be protected by statute. Id. at
1959.
99 Indeed, subsequent to Garcetti-in an effort to provide additional protection
for public employee speech-a bill entitled the Federal Employee Protection of
Disclosures Act was introduced on January 11, 2007 in the U.S. Senate. See S. 274,
110th Cong. (2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congressbilltext.xpd?bill
=s110-274.
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provide these protections, it can enact the necessary civil service
laws. Indeed, just as whistleblower laws have been enacted to
protect certain types of public employee speech, various civil
service laws have been enacted to provide the same kind of
protection to public employees that a democratic community
wishes to provide. 10 0 If society is concerned about oppressive
governmental employment practices, just as if society is
concerned about public employees exposing governmental waste
or corruption, then it can address the problems through the
legislative process.
Moreover, if government agencies are
oppressively silencing watchdog speech, and if government
supervisors are unfairly firing employees, then the legislature
can pass laws that require change. But aside from such laws, the
government should be free to decide the rules for its own
employment arena.
Public employees should not gain additional rights that
private employees do not have. Just as the First Amendment is
concerned with the constitutional rights of citizens, not public
employees, the Due Process Clause is concerned with property
held by individuals as citizens, not as public employees.
The distinction between citizen and employee, for purposes
of defining the constitutional right of due process, is based on the
fact that the latter can be changed in a way that the former can
not. As Professor Kozel explains:
There is a market for employment, but there is no market for
federal constitutional sovereignty. If a citizen is not satisfied by
the package of constitutional rights that the government affords
her, she has no ability to choose a new federal constitutional
sovereign, at least within the country. But the employment
Employees, the Holmesian approach
market is different.
contends, have choices as to where they will work: choices
between public and private employers, and among employers
within each category. 101
This is what due process guarantees were meant to protect
against: adverse and arbitrary property deprivations by a

100 See Cynthia L. Estlund, What Do Workers Want? Employee Interests, Public
Interests, and Freedom of Expression Under the National Labor RelationsAct, 140 U.
PA. L. REV. 921, 1004 n.8 (1992) ("[C]ivil service laws ... generally require some
cause for discharge and provide for hearings on the issue [and] offer some protection
to public employees against retaliatory discharge.").
101Kozel, supra note 55, at 1030-31.
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10 2
sovereign authority to which the individual has no recourse.
Once the governmental sovereign acts upon a citizen, that citizen
has no ability to step outside that citizen-sovereign relationship
to seek justice or compensation, since there is only one
governmental sovereign. For instance, if the government takes a
person's home, that home has been lost for good. In the absence
of due process requirements, there is no other authority to which
that person can appeal for retribution. But, if a person loses a
government job, there is a host of other employment options
available. The simplest, most available remedy is merely to find
a job in the private sector.
An individual has little choice over what governmental
entity is to rule over him or her. A citizen of the United States
must abide by the laws of the U.S. government. That citizen, as
long as she resides in the United States, is subject to the laws of
the U.S. government; she cannot pick and choose which
government is to hold power over her. But, when a person
becomes a public employee, it is a voluntary choice-just one of
many employment choices available to that individual. Indeed,
there are many areas in which government employees do not
have the same constitutional rights as citizens do. For instance,
public employees may have their property searched without a
warrant supported by probable cause, as required by the Fourth
Amendment. 10 3 Even though the Fifth Amendment prohibits the
government from forcing private citizens to provide incriminating
information, government employees can be fired when the
incriminating information given by the employee relates to their
job duties. 10 4 Moreover, under the Hatch Act, federal government
employees are restricted in their political activities in ways in
which private citizens are not.105

CONCLUSION

As highlighted in the public employee speech cases, the
citizen-employee distinction is an important one for determining
102 See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (stating that
due process is "intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the
powers of government").
103 See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987).
104 See Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278 (1968).
105 See U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548

(1973) (upholding the constitutionality of the Hatch Act).
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the placement of constitutional rights. As citizens, individuals
enjoy the full protections accorded by the Constitution. But, as
public employees, individuals are governed by the employment
relationship existing between them and their government
employer. Consequently, a government employee's job interests
should not be considered property for purposes of due process
protections. Indeed, it seems somewhat paradoxical to refer to
the due process property rights of public employees in an at-will
economy.
Furthermore, since it is public employees who
essentially constitute the government, it seems odd to have a
situation where the same people are depriving rights as are
claiming the deprivation; thus, by becoming a part of
the government, public employees acknowledge that the
government must have the power to ensure its own
effective operation. Moreover, while most forms of property are
inheritable from generation to generation, government jobs have
no such quality.
In dealing with public employee speech, the courts during
the 1960s moved away from the right-privilege doctrine and
began granting more expansive speech rights to public
employees. However, with its recent decision in Garcetti, the
Court is now drifting back somewhat to its earlier approach. It is
giving more deference to the government's need for managing its
employees, and is thus moving closer to the private sector model.
Lik'ewise, the Court should consider a similar move with respect
to a public employee's due process rights.

